| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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We already have support for the `base` unauthenticated mode, so this
just adds the `auth` mode where the sender's key pair is added to
the ECDH shared key derivation mix. This ensures that a message may
only be successfully opened if the sender was in possession of the
private key (`skS`) corresponding to the expected public key (`pkS`).
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vespa-engine/revert-26152-revert-26139-vekterli/add-content-state-api-capability
Reapply: add `vespa.content.state_api` capability"
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PeerPolicy" MERGEOK"
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Revert "Store original capability (set) names from JSON config in PeerPolicy" MERGEOK
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vespa-engine/vekterli/add-content-state-api-capability
Add `vespa.content.state_api` capability
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Add new capability to existing `vespa.telemetry` capability set.
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Add additional helper methods to convert `names <=> capabilities`.
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Also add a friendlier `toString()` that hex dumps the enc/ciphertext fields.
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Require 'vespa.rpc.unclassified' by default for all JRT APIs
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Introduce functional interface ToCapabilitySet to simplify construction of second order capability sets.
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Implements a protocol for delegated access to a shared secret key
of a token whose private key we do not possess. This builds directly
on top of the existing token resealing mechanisms.
The primary benefit of the resealing protocol is that none of the
data exchanged can reveal anything about the underlying secret.
Security note: neither resealing requests nor responses are explicitly
authenticated (this is a property inherited from the sealed shared
key tokens themselves). It is assumed that an attacker can observe
all requests and responses in transit, but cannot modify them.
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versions" (#25436)
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This is to get around the limitation where AES GCM can only produce
a maximum of 64 GiB of ciphertext for a particular <key, IV> pair before
its security properties break down. ChaCha20-Poly1305 does not have any
practical limitations here.
ChaCha20-Poly1305 uses a 256-bit key whereas the shared key is 128 bits.
A HKDF is used to internally expand the key material to 256 bits.
To let token based decryption be fully backwards compatible, introduce
a token version 2. V1 tokens will be decrypted with AES-GCM 128, while
V2 tokens use ChaCha20-Poly1305.
As a bonus, cryptographic operations will generally be _faster_ after
this cipher change, as we use BouncyCastle ciphers and these do not use
any native AES instructions. ChaCha20-Poly1305 is usually considerably
faster when running without specialized hardware support. An ad-hoc
experiment with a large ciphertext showed a near 70% performance increase
over AES-GCM 128.
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No functional changes, just bugged me to have used the wrong order.
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Wrong base was "close enough" that test seemingly worked most of the time...!
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This resolves two issues:
* `javax.crypto.OutputCipherStream` swallows MAC tag mismatch exceptions
when the stream is closed, which means that corruptions (intentional
or not) are not caught. This is documented behavior, but still very
surprising and a rather questionable default. BC's interchangeable
`CipherOutputStream` throws as expected. To avoid regressions, add an
explicit test that both ciphertext and MAC tag corruptions are propagated.
* The default-provided `AES/GCM/NoPadding` `Cipher` instance will not emit
decrypted plaintext per `update()` chunk, but buffer everything until
`doFinal()` is invoked when the stream is closed. This means that decrypting
very large ciphertexts can blow up memory usage since internal output
buffers are reallocated and increased per iteration...! Instead use an
explicit BC `GCMBlockCipher` which has the expected behavior (and actually
lets cipher streams, well, _stream_). Add an `AeadCipher` abstraction to
avoid leaking BC APIs outside the security module.
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Adds underlying support--and tooling--for resealing a token for
another recipient. This allows for delegating decryption to another
party without having to reveal the private key of the original
recipient (or having to send the raw underlying secret key over a
potentially insecure channel). Key ID can/should change as part of
this operation.
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* Base62 minimizes extra size overhead relative to Base64.
* Base58 removes ambiguous characters from key encodings.
Common for both bases is that they do not emit any characters that
interfer with easily selecting them on web pages or in the CLI.
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Adds a codec that enables easy conversion from an array of bytes to any
numeric base in [2, 256) and back again, using a supplied custom alphabet.
Implemented by treating the input byte sequence to encode verbatim as a
big-endian `BigInteger` and iteratively doing a `divmod` operation until
the quotient is zero, emitting the modulus mapped onto the alphabet for
each iteration.
Decoding reverses this process, ending up with the same `BigInteger` as
in the initial encoding step.
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Enforces invariants and avoids having to pass raw byte arrays around.
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This makes key IDs vastly more expressive. Max size is 255 bytes,
and UTF-8 form is enforced by checking that the byte sequence can be
identity-transformed to and from a string with UTF-8 encoding.
In addition, we now protect the integrity of the key ID by supplying
it as the AAD parameter to the key sealing and opening operations.
Reduce v1 token max length of `enc` part to 255, since this is always
an X25519 public key, which is never bigger than 32 bytes (but may
be _less_ if the random `BigInteger` is small enough, so we still have
to encode the length).
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Adds support for:
* X25519 key pair generation
* HPKE stream encryption with public key and token generation
* HPKE stream decryption with private key
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Also use AES-128 instead of AES-256 for the one-time key since the underlying
HPKE AEAD cipher protecting the key itself is AES-128.
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